chore: initialize Gitea v1.27.2 fork
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Includes direct password setup links in registration emails. Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5
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// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package actions
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import (
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"context"
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repo_model "gitea.dev/models/repo"
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"gitea.dev/models/unit"
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)
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// ComputeTaskTokenPermissions computes the effective permissions for a job token against the target repository.
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// It uses the job's stored permissions (if any), then applies org/repo clamps and fork/cross-repo restrictions.
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// Note: target repository access policy checks are enforced in GetActionsUserRepoPermission; this function only computes the job token's effective permission ceiling.
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func ComputeTaskTokenPermissions(ctx context.Context, task *ActionTask, targetRepo *repo_model.Repository) (ret repo_model.ActionsTokenPermissions, err error) {
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if err := task.LoadJob(ctx); err != nil {
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return ret, err
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}
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if err := task.Job.LoadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
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return ret, err
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}
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runRepo := task.Job.Repo
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if err := runRepo.LoadOwner(ctx); err != nil {
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return ret, err
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}
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repoActionsCfg := runRepo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions).ActionsConfig()
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ownerActionsCfg, err := GetOwnerActionsConfig(ctx, runRepo.OwnerID)
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if err != nil {
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return ret, err
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}
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var jobDeclaredPerms repo_model.ActionsTokenPermissions
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if task.Job.TokenPermissions != nil {
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jobDeclaredPerms = *task.Job.TokenPermissions
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} else if repoActionsCfg.OverrideOwnerConfig {
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jobDeclaredPerms = repoActionsCfg.GetDefaultTokenPermissions()
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} else {
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jobDeclaredPerms = ownerActionsCfg.GetDefaultTokenPermissions()
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}
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var effectivePerms repo_model.ActionsTokenPermissions
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if repoActionsCfg.OverrideOwnerConfig {
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effectivePerms = repoActionsCfg.ClampPermissions(jobDeclaredPerms)
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} else {
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effectivePerms = ownerActionsCfg.ClampPermissions(jobDeclaredPerms)
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}
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// Cross-repository access and fork pull requests are strictly read-only for security.
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// This ensures a "task repo" cannot gain write access to other repositories via CrossRepoAccess settings.
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isSameRepo := task.Job.RepoID == targetRepo.ID
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restrictCrossRepoAccess := task.IsForkPullRequest || !isSameRepo
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if restrictCrossRepoAccess {
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effectivePerms = repo_model.ClampActionsTokenPermissions(effectivePerms, repo_model.MakeRestrictedPermissions())
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}
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return effectivePerms, nil
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}
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